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UNPACKING THE GLOBAL CRISIS: 
Neo-liberalism, Financial Crises, and Authoritarian Liberalism* 
 
Bonn Juego1 and Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt2 
Global Development Studies 
Aalborg University, Denmark 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The paper hopes to contribute to a reading of the political economy of the current global crisis with a 
focus on four interrelated themes. First, we discuss the constitutive role and functional character of 
crises in the evolution of neo-liberalism in particular and in capitalist reproduction in general. Second, 
we investigate the mechanisms by which financial crises recur by highlighting the structure-agency 
dynamics in finance capitalism; specifically, the structural tendency of financial markets to 
disintegrate that has been exacerbated by misbehaviour of economic agents. Third, we look at 
opposing crisis responses—from multilaterals to regional organisations to global civil society—and 
realise that responses from either pro-neoliberal or anti-neoliberal forces are fundamentally the same 
through the years, simply re-articulating analyses and programmes that they have respectively 
pursued and advocated long before the global crisis. And fourth, in the context of East and Southeast 
Asia, we examine the tendencies of the global crisis vis-à-vis the strengthening and even acceleration 
of emergent authoritarian liberalism in the region despite and because of the global crisis. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
he world is under a cacophony of crises. There have been simultaneous crises in finance, 
production, food, environment, climate, energy, and governance over the last three 
decades which have culminated in the current deep recession. Since the subprime crisis 
became apparent in August 2007 with the US officially hitting recession by December of the 
same year, the epicenter of the financial earthquake has not left other economies unharmed, 
spilling over both in the developed and developing worlds. The crisis has thus become a 
global phenomenon, now to be recognised in history as the ‘Great Recession of 2008’. While 
crisis moments in capitalism have been viewed traditionally as a conjunctural phase, today 
actors from various ideological positions perceive the situation in the ‘Chinese way’ as both 
danger and opportunity—i.e., an opportune moment to advance their respective interests and 
not as a structural and more fundamental problem of the capitalist mode of production. 
 
Crisis connotes ‘the turning point of a disease when an important change takes place, 
indicating either recovery or death’—or as Karl Polanyi (1944) would have said: a ‘double 
movement’ whereby the expansion of market relations generates reactions from the society to 
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protect itself from the consequences of the very operation of the allegedly self-regulating 
market. As to whether the cacophony of crises would lead to the recovery or death to the 
hegemonic capitalist, neo-liberal system is a political economy question to be determined by 
the unfolding struggle between the forces for recovery and the forces for change. 
 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to a reading of the political economy of the current 
global crisis with a focus on four interrelated themes. The first part attempts to situate the 
global crisis against the background of the relationship between crises and neo-liberalism. 
Here we examine the constitutive role of crises in the evolution of neo-liberalism, and argue 
that crises have been functional to capitalist reproduction. Second, the paper investigates the 
mechanisms of the recurrence of financial crises under conditions of global capitalism. In 
doing so, we present a structure-agency dynamics in finance capitalism; specifically, the 
structural tendency of financial markets to disintegrate that has been exacerbated by 
misbehaviour of economic agents. Third, the focus shifts to the various crisis responses 
coming from opposing ideological positions. Here the argument is that the responses of both 
pro- and anti-neoliberal forces are fundamentally the same through the years, re-articulating 
analyses and programmes that have been pursued and advocated long before the global crisis. 
And fourth, the prospects and future of emergent authoritarian liberalism in East and 
Southeast Asia are analysed in the context of the current global crisis. One of the lessons of 
the Asia financial crisis might be seen as a case for a probable strengthening and even 
acceleration of authoritarian liberalism despite and because of the global crisis. 
 
 
The Constitutive Role and Functional Character of Crises in the Evolution 
of Neo-liberalism (1970s-2009) 
 
Crises have played a constitutive role in the history of capitalist development. Neo-
liberalism, which is the political-economic development paradigm that replaced the postwar 
Keynesian-Fordist, mass production-mass consumption national developmentalism phase in 
the global political economy of development, has also survived by capitalism’s cycle of 
crises and booms. 
 
The relationship between crises and neo-liberalism can be said to be either dysfunctional 
or functional, or both. Every time neo-liberalism comes into crisis, its critics, mostly coming 
from the Left, get excited about its imminent collapse and the dawning of an alternative 
system. They view crises as having a dysfunctional effect to the system. However, the almost 
40 year history of neo-liberalism suggests that crises have been more functional, rather than 
dysfunctional, to its perpetuation in terms of capitalist social relations, market-led 
development strategies, and neo-liberal state restructuring. 
 
The constitutive role of crises in the life cycle of neo-liberalism refers to the fact that neo-
liberalism: [a] was born out of the crises of the 1970s; [b] has evolved through a series of 
crises over the last 30 years; and [c] died of the cacophony of crises culminating in the 
current global economic crisis. 
 
Neo-liberalism: Born out of the crises of the 1970s 
 
Monocausal explanations about the emergence of neo-liberalism abound. These 
explanations do not go far enough simply because they fail to capture the complex processes 
involved and the dynamism of actors at play in the origin and evolution of neo-liberal 
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globalisation. 
 
The neo-classical revolution (Toye 1987) became the main initiator of neo-liberal 
globalisation understood as a product of the complex interaction of forces, events, and 
phenomena and their mutually reinforcing tendencies that became more conspicuous during 
the crisis of the mid-1970s. A recession hit the developed capitalist economies in 1973 and 
thereafter extended to the less developed countries. The OPEC oil crisis coinciding with the 
US defeat in the Vietnam War and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system shook the 
world. This led to a situation where money became de-linked from the gold standard. The 
internationalisation of financial markets set in as a result of the gradual widespread 
abandonment of foreign exchange controls. Third World countries resorted to massive 
foreign bank borrowings, were subjected to IMF and World Bank conditionalities, and were 
thus required to cut state expenditure, devalue their currencies, and remove barriers to the 
free movement of capital. They also had to abandon their dream to be active catching-up 
economies in a supposedly new international economic order as they had to shift from 
import-substitution to export promotion development strategies. The alternative and 
challenge posed by command economies proved to be empty as they too faced growing 
stagnation. Global production was restructured towards post-Fordism and multinational 
corporations (MNCs) were growing while international financial capital gained an important 
role and threatened to supplant the importance of productive capital. ‘Sound’ macroeconomic 
policies through privatisation, deregulation, and liberalisation became the norm that resulted 
in, among others, the weakening of trade unions, the cutting of state budgets for social 
welfare and other entitlements, and the destruction of the developing countries’ 
manufacturing and agricultural bases. Information and communications technology (ICT) 
which grew out of the military industrial complex, was induced into the private sector in 
1971 with the introduction of Intel’s microchip—it was advancing and became the new 
‘techno-economic paradigm’ shaping production patterns, financial investments, as well as 
social relations. 
 
As a result of the combined and uneven process of capitalist development in the era of 
neo-liberal globalisation, these developments triggered by the crisis of the 1970s in the world 
economy, have shaped to a large extent, but did not entirely determine, the political, 
economic, and cultural relations at the domestic levels. They have taken varying forms and 
effects from state to state within the spatio-temporal landscape of neo-liberalism. 
 
Neo-liberalism evolving through crises—from crisis to crisis in the last 30 years 
 
According to some estimates, there have been over 100 financial crises in the world in the 
last 30 years. Yet, notwithstanding these statistics, it is palpably evident that the majority of 
the peoples and societies in the world have long been in crisis. Crises have been inherent 
from the very birth of neo-liberalism to a series of transformations it has undertaken over the 
decades. 
 
The global political economy of development since the 1960s could generally be 
characterised into three successive political-economic phases: national developmentalism 
from the postwar to the 1970s; the Washington Consensus from the 1980s to the mid-1990s; 
and the post-Washington Consensus from the mid-1990s to present. Each of these phases 
with concomitant paradigms came into serious restrategising to cope with the major crises 
that confronted their legitimacy and very existence. True to form, as the Greek krisis aptly 
means ‘turning point in a disease’, every crisis compels the capitalist mode of production to 
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innovate and to transform itself to secure its hegemony. 
 
The national developmentalism phase of capitalist development or the so-called ‘Golden 
Age’ from the 1960s to 1973 took the forms of Fordist régime of accumulation in the US and 
Western Europe, ‘populist’ import-substituting development in Latin America, and 
developmental states in East and Southeast Asia. By the early 1970s, the more than a decade 
‘stability’ that the Golden Age brought to the capitalist world came to a severe jolt and the 
mass production – mass consumption techno-economic paradigm in the industrialised 
economies had been structurally exhausted (see Perez 2002). As stagflation reached 
unbearable heights by the mid-1970s, national developmentalism’s Keynesian approach of 
active state role in economic development through demand-side, fluctuations-mitigating 
monetary policies failed to realise the target of full employment and price stability and, more 
importantly, to sustain the harmony between productivity and real wage. The crises of the 
mid-1970s thus gave way to transform capitalism into a new development paradigm referred 
to as global neo-liberalism although at the same time allowing Listian state-led approaches in 
East and Southeast Asia according to their status as front-line states to Communism. 
 
Neo-liberalism has often been divided into two distinct yet successive phases: the 
Washington Consensus (the first generation neo-liberal reforms) and the post-Washington 
Consensus (the second generation reforms). The difference between the two phases cannot be 
simply reduced into a state-versus-market debate, in which the Washington Consensus is said 
to be the subordination of states to markets and the post-Washington Consensus, on the other 
hand, promotes a complementary relationship between them. The state-versus-market debate 
or a zero-sum game between states and markets is hollow. By merely taking the 
transformation of capitalism at face value, it misses the historical reality that active state 
interventions to make markets work have been present from the very beginning of capitalist 
development. The difference between the two development paradigms lies not in form, but in 
the substantial agenda on goals and strategies. The Washington Consensus aimed to realise 
an open global market economy through structural adjustment programmes and sound 
macroeconomic policies of privatisation, deregulation, liberalisation, and financial reforms. 
The post-Washington Consensus, on the other hand, is a project towards the realisation of 
‘universal convergence on competitiveness’ through deep institutional and behavioural 
reforms and policies on labour market flexibility, human capital, and social capital (see 
Cammack 2009a). 
 
Aside from its dismal performance not only in the developed countries but especially in 
poor countries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia marked by declining growth rates, rising 
unemployment and the informalisation of labour, and race-to-the-bottom wage policies and 
labour standards, the Washington Consensus got into a major ideological crisis. In particular, 
its market fundamentalism ideology—that markets are efficient and government intervention 
in the economy is bad—came to blows with Keynesian economists like Joseph Stiglitz. In 
1989, John Williamson, recognised for coining the term ‘Washington Consensus’, introduced 
the 10 neo-liberal policy reforms, namely: fiscal discipline, reordering of public expenditure 
priorities, tax reform, liberalisation of interest rates, competitive exchange rate, trade 
liberalisation, inward FDI liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation, and protection of 
property rights. But it only took less than four years for these reforms to be ideologically 
dismantled with the Stiglitz-led and Japanese financed policy report on the East Asian 
Miracle (1993), which provided empirical evidence of eight high performing Asian 
economies (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, 
Taiwan, and Thailand) showing their success between 1965 and 1990 in realising high 
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growth and human development through limited state intervention (World Bank 1993). 
 
Stiglitz advocated the Post-Washington Consensus project during his stint as senior vice 
president for development economics and chief economist of the World Bank from 1997 to 
2000. With the aim of employing more policy instruments and broadening development 
goals, which is unlike the rather narrow macroeconomic policies and goals of the Washington 
Consensus, the post-Washington Consensus has promoted the use of ‘social variables’ to 
make ‘markets work better’ (Stiglitz 1998). Both in policy and discourse, ‘social capital’ has 
been peddled as the ‘missing link in development’. The use of social capital as a policy and 
ideological tool allows the World Bank and its affiliates to enlarge the circuit of capital, 
incorporating social variables that are traditionally left out in mainstream economics such as 
states, institutions, policy coordination, civil society, workers, culture, and family (Fine 2001; 
see also Cammack 2003). It likewise provided the Bank the framework to promote an agenda 
for sustainable development, egalitarian development, and democratic development. 
However, this begs the question: More policy instruments and broader development goals for 
whom? The answer is straightforward: as the 2002 World Development Report title goes 
‘institutions for markets’. 
 
Cacophony of Crises: RIP Neo-liberalism (1980s-2008) 
 
As the post-Washington Consensus promotes more policy instruments and broader 
development goals, the current global crisis has revealed more crises and broader poverty 
curse. The world has been in crisis for longer than anyone would care to remember. It is 
currently under a cacophony of crises, among others, in: finance, food price (the Great 
Hunger of 2008), overaccumulation, overproduction, over- and/or under-consumption, 
climate change, ecological degradation, political legitimacy, global governance, oil and 
energy, and water. The recent global crisis is nothing but a culmination of the neo-liberal 
bust, of the cacophony of structural crises in the past now simultaneously wreaking havoc to 
economies, societies, families, and human life itself. 
 
The demise of the Soviet Union indirectly favoured the spread of neo-liberalism to the 
extent that the ‘socialist’ alternative was removed from the equation of state-society relation. 
It ought to be recalled that regardless of what we may have thought about state-socialism, it is 
a fact that the Keynesian macro-economic model and the social-democratic project of the 
Welfare State were meant to counter the influence of socialism in the advanced capitalist 
nations of Western Europe and North America. The existence and presence on the world 
scene of the USSR as well as Maoist China also contributed to the decolonisation process in 
the former colonial empires and the emergence of the bourgeois-nationalist regimes. The 
question today is whether the crisis of hegemony in the world system as epitomised by the 
relative decline of the United States and the rise of the emerging countries—i.e., China, India 
and Brasil—opens a new phase in the history of capitalism as it is transforming the 
international division of labour and increasing potential resource-conflicts as Michael Klare 
(2002) would argue. In this connection it is important to ‘bring in’ the significance of war in 
the history of capitalism and especially of militarism in this stage of history and particularly 
ask whether this spells the end of the present unstable epoch of capitalism. 
 
Has neo-liberalism died of the current cacophony of crises? Of course, the answer 
depends on what one means of neo-liberalism. 
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‘Neo-liberalism’ here refers to that specific form (market fundamentalism), that specific 
class relation (hegemony of capital over labour), that specific process of capital accumulation 
(using money to make more money), that specific configuration of capitalism (liberalism with 
new configuration), that specific phase of capitalist development with the ascendancy of 
financial cum productive capital (postwar), those specific sets of 10 economic reform policies 
enshrined in the SAPs (Washington Consensus). Neo-liberalism is basically ‘economic 
liberalism’ with ‘neo’/new configurations. It is this neo-liberal form and configuration of 
capitalism that has died, but not the substance of capitalism as a process of capital 
accumulation and relations in which labour is subordinated to capital. There is furthermore a 
need to emphasise that neo-liberalism, just as capitalism has always been, is a political 
project—that is, neo-liberalism depends on the intervention of the state (Polanyi 1944; see 
also Bugra and Agartan 2007). The dismantling of the welfare state could not have taken 
place without the weakening of labour through policies carried out by the state and this point 
has important implications for the eventual re-emergence of labour as a counter- and anti-
capitalist force. 
 
The proponents of neo-liberalism representing the dominance of private capital are all too 
aware of the crisis-prone and conflict-ridden nature of the capitalist system. Hence, neo-
liberalism has always been promoted as a strategy for continued ‘de-regulation’ and at the 
same time a blueprint for crisis management. In the interest of capital accumulation and new 
profits they always look at crisis moments as perfect moments to further entrench, and never 
retreat from, neo-liberal institutions and practices. In the words of Michael Bruno former 
Chief Economist at the World Bank: ‘There is a growing consensus about the idea that a 
large enough crisis may shock otherwise reluctant policymakers into instituting productivity 
enhancing reforms’ (cf. Klein 2008: 311). 
 
The rather upbeat attitude of the enthusiastic apologists for further neo-liberalisation does 
not necessarily come from ‘faith’ in the invisible hand or in the supposed harmony-creating 
mechanisms of the market but rather to promote the interests and power of private capital 
over labour and collective governance in the interest of the general public. The seeming 
complacency may have come from the historical fact that recessions do not last that long 
enough as to bring about the collapse of the system. In a recent study by the National Bureau 
of Economic Research (NBER), incidents of recessions in post-World War II, from 1948 to 
2001, lasted only from six to 18 months (NBER 2008, as cited in Isidore 2008). Interestingly, 
the UN’s Final Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations 
General Assembly on Reforms on the International Monetary and Financial System (2009) 
observes that the short and easy recovery from previous recessions—i.e., short and easy 
enough as to take the needed reforms to be enforced—might be a crucial reason for 
understanding the recurrence of crises. 
 
Take for example the neo-liberal responses to successive crises since the 1980s. When 
Latin America was in a deep debt crisis in 1982, IMF and pro-capitalist political forces 
imposed SAPs as conditionalities for rolling over debts, a harmful consequence of which was 
massive deindustrialisation and rise in unemployment, poverty and uneven development all 
over the region. In addition, the responses to several financial crises in the last 20 years—
namely, Scandinavia (early 1990s), Mexico (1994), East & Southeast Asia (1997), Russia 
(1998), Argentina (2001), Turkey (2001-2002), US subprime mortgage (2007), the Great 
Recession (2008)—have had as their overarching theme an open ‘international financial 
architecture’ through regulatory institutions that guarantee the domestic and global rights of 
private capital. Despite acknowledgement of the usefulness of some capital controls (like in 
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the cases of Chile and Malaysia), the IMF and neo-liberal forces further promoted policies 
toward effective neo-liberal regulation to smoothen adjustment to the supposed openness of 
the international financial system (e.g., IMF’s surveillance mechanism). 
 
Further, the 2007-2009 US Subprime/Credit crisis was responded through bailouts and 
stimulus packages. In his account of the history of neo-liberalism, David Harvey (2005) sees 
post-WWII neo-liberalism, as an attempt at consolidating and restoring capitalist class power. 
The Reagan-Thatcher configuration of capitalism promoted a new phase of ideological 
assault on the working class. The Bush-Paulson-Bernanke-Obama bailouts programme, for 
instance, is therefore reminiscent of the birth of neo-liberalism. It is an attempt to consolidate 
and restore the power of corporations, assure the ascendancy of finance capital, and hence 
save capitalism from its own destruction. As Wade and Veneroso (1998) puts it, citing the 
Asia crisis as a case in point, but still very apt today: ‘Financial crises have always caused 
transfers of ownership and power to those who keep their own assets intact and who are in a 
position to create credit’. They went on to recall the memorable lines attributed to Andrew 
Mellon, an American banker and former Secretary of Treasury during the Great Depression: 
‘In a depression assets return to their rightful owners’. 
 
 
Dynamics of Recurrent Financial Crises: Structural Instability and 
Agential Greed 
 
What the global crisis has unveiled is the unfettered ascendancy of finance capital and its 
eventual burst, gluttonously squeezing out value out of already created value at the expense 
of the stagnation of the real economy, and hence prospective technological innovation and 
employment. The unfolding world economic crisis ‘manifests (the) huge, unresolved 
problems in the real economy that have been literally papered over by debt for decades, as 
well as a financial crunch of a depth unseen in the postwar epoch. It is the mutually 
reinforcing interaction between weakening capital accumulation and the disintegration of the 
financial sector that has made the downward slide so intractable for policy makers and its 
potential for catastrophe so evident’ (Brenner 2009). As a result of neo-liberal finance 
relaxation (cf. Panitch and Konings 2009), finance capital has ventured into unbridled 
speculative adventurism instead of acting as lifeblood of the real economy. For instance, the 
so-called ‘sovereign wealth funds’ (SWFs), which gained prominence in the 2008 World 
Economic Forum due to its growing financial clout now estimated to be around USD 4 
trillion, are state assets coming from natural resource earnings, surplus, and savings. These 
funds were traditionally utilised to serve and strengthen the productive sector. But an 
investigation of their investments today would point to the fact that almost all of the assets 
are allocated to financial services and instruments in the forms of stocks, bonds, and equities 
and just a few single-digit percentages for infrastructure projects and the productive sector. 
These include the big SWFs in Alaska, Alberta, Abu Dhabi, Norway, and Singapore. 
 
The shifting roles of money in the development of the real economy in the history of 
global capitalism are best depicted by Arthur Cecil Pigou in his Veil of Money (1949, as cited 
in Perez 2002: 6): 
 
In the years preceding the First World War there were in common use among economists 
a number of metaphors . . . ‘Money is a wrapper in which goods come’; ‘Money is the 
garment draped round the body of economic life’; ‘money is a veil behind which the 
action of real economic forces is concealed’ . . . 
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During the 1920s and 1930s . . . money, the passive veil, took on the appearance of an 
evil genius; the garment became a Nessus shirt; the wrapper a thing liable to explode. 
Money, in short, after being little or nothing, was now everything . . . 
 
Then with the Second World War, the tune changed again. Manpower, equipment and 
organisation once more came into their own. The role of money dwindled to 
insignificance.... 
 
Far from Polanyi’s (1957) description of money, together with land and labour, as a 
‘fictitious commodity’ because it was not ‘produced for sale’ (see also Jessop 2007), the view 
towards money in this epoch of neo-liberal globalisation has gone back to its 1920s and 
1930s moment. The accumulation process at this time entails money’s self-reproduction 
through speculative activities and other innovative financial instruments like derivatives, 
which Warren Buffet (2002) regards as lethal ‘financial weapons of mass destruction’ and 
‘time bombs’ susceptible to explode and cause the implosion of the entire economic system. 
Interestingly, it is at times when money was treated as ‘everything’ that major crises occur 
and recur—that is, the Great Depression of 1929 and the Great Recession of 2008. 
 
Several important complementary mechanisms can also be identified that contributed to 
the domination of finance and the stagnation of the real economy, namely: the vicious effect 
of compound interests, the relationship of technology with finance, and the ‘natural’ 
instability of financial markets (Reinert 2008). 
 
Compound Interests 
 
Borrowers often underestimate the effect of compound interests in financial transactions. 
Left unattended, especially at this moment of a fiat monetary system that has replaced the 
gold standard, compound interests could grow ad infinitum. The English economist, Richard 
Price (1769, as cited in Reinert 2008) made an intelligent calculation: ‘A shilling put out at 
6% compound interest at our Saviour’s birth would . . . have increased to a greater sum than 
the whole solar system could hold, supposing it a sphere equal in diameter to the diameter of 
Saturn’s orbit’. 
 
The finance historian Michael Hudson (2000, 2007), who has been studying the economic 
origins of modern civilisation, made an important point that demands recall today: 
 
The limits-to-growth warnings proved to be premature a generation ago, but one cannot 
say the same thing for the growth of debts/savings at compound interest year after year. 
Any statistician plotting the growth of an economy’s debt quickly finds that existing 
trends are not sustainable. The growth of debt has become the major cause of economic 
downturns, austerity and financial polarization, creating financial crashes and, in severe 
cases, social crises. (Hudson 2000: 310-311) 
 
Indeed, what differentiates money from other forms of capital and commodities is the fact 
that money is limitless (see Harvey 1982 [2007]). 
 
Technological Revolutions and Financial Bubbles 
 
In her groundbreaking historical study of the changing relationship between technological 
revolutions and finance capital which is akin to a research on long waves, the Venezuelan 
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economist Carlota Perez (2002) has shown the existence of remarkable dynamic regularities 
and recurrent sequences of change in the capitalist system. In particular, financial markets are 
said to have a ‘love affair’ with a new breakthrough technology. This was evident, among 
others, with the boom-bust cycles of the US Steel Corporation’s market shares at the 
beginning of the 20th century as the techno-economic paradigm was transitioning from the 
‘Age of Steel, Electricity and Heavy Engineering’ to the ‘Age of Oil, Automobiles and Mass 
Production’ and of the Microsoft Corporation at the deployment period of the ICT from the 
1970s until the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2001. 
 
The history of technological revolutions, which is inescapably linked with the power of 
finance capital, is one of continuity of the nature and logic of the capitalist system, of 
recurrence of its historical structure. At the irruption of a technological revolution, configured 
in a particular techno-economic paradigm, all existing industries and activities are 
modernised. The process of diffusion of this historical moment across the economy 
constitutes a great surge of development. Each surge that approximately lasts for a half 
century has two distinct periods (namely, the installation period and the deployment period), 
which are mediated by a turning point. Each of these periods in recurring sequence then 
undergoes four phases (with each phase lasting around a decade): irruption, frenzy – turning 
point – synergy and maturity. As a result, this massive economic transformation involves 
complex processes of social assimilation which may also require the adaptation of socio-
institutional framework to each paradigm, and the eventual need for a process of ‘institutional 
creative destruction’ for the introduction and diffusion of the next technological revolution 
(Perez 2002; see also Juego 2009). With an understanding of this seeming historical 
regularity of boom-bust cycle between technology and finance, the collapse of the Internet 
bubble is no cause for surprise. The kind of euphoria brought about by the excitement in new 
technology and in financial mania in the global economy, eventually leading to a recession, is 
nothing unprecedented. The same logic of the changing relationship between technological 
revolutions and finance capital that shapes the pattern of economic cycles can be extrapolated 
to the current global recession. Reinforcing this structural logic in finance and technology are 
the greedy and corrupt economic elites like the Parmalat speculative activities and the Enron 
fraudulent practices just a few years ago and that of the egoistic and egotistic ‘too-big-to-fail’ 
financial institutions like AIG and Lehman Brothers recently. However, this perspective on 
the love affair between new technology and financial capital should also be understood in the 
context of the role of the state and the military industrial complex as initiator and controller 
of capital and labour inputs to the emergence of the techno-economic paradigm in times of 
busts and booms. 
 
Inherent Instability of Financial Markets and the Greedy Economic Elites 
 
The post-Keynesian economist Hyman Minsky (1992) makes an important hypothesis on 
the inherent instability of the financial markets that can help explain the logic of repeated 
financial crises under capitalism. Well-known for his contribution on ‘Ponzi finance’, Minsky 
also highlights the idea of ‘endogenous instability’ in financial markets which means ‘that 
stability in the economic system generates behaviours that produce fragility, and increasing 
fragility makes the system more prone to an unstable response to change in financial or other 
conditions that are relevant to the return on investment projects’ (Kregel 2008: 1). In other 
words, sustained periods of stability as such inevitably produce increasing fragility. This 
analysis, however, may be more suitable in the case of developed economies with ‘advanced’ 
financial system like the US and the Europe where banks and other credit actors play 
prominent roles in financial transactions. In developing countries like the Philippines and 
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India, for example, where the majority of labour and economic transactions are in the 
informal sector, businesses are established and conducted through channels other than banks 
such as borrowing money from friends and family and using personal savings. 
 
Bankers are believed to be inherently pessimistic towards the prospective returns of 
borrowers. This is even more the case in poor countries with fragile institutions. It is perhaps 
safe to assume that lending agents are more skeptical in poor countries because of the high 
risks involved. Nevertheless, the rich and the poor equally feel the scourge of Ponzi finance, 
which is a type of finance where expected revenues cannot even afford either principal or 
interest payments resulting in the subjection of agents to increasing debt. Third World debt is 
a classic and ugly example of a Ponzi finance scheme perpetuating the unjust process of what 
Gunnar Myrdal refers to as ‘perverse backwashes’ in which funds tend to flow from the poor 
to the rich. 
 
Subprime loans are also considered a Ponzi scheme in which financial institutions 
redefine the rules of the game where, especially in times of crisis, they no longer compete for 
market share but instead pull out or withdraw from the transaction in order to be more liquid. 
Under this condition of liquidity preference, even ‘sound’ projects are refused credits, and 
hence a downward spiral starts (Reinert 2008). The repeal of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act 
with the legislation of Financial Services Modernization Act in 1999 (see Panitch and 
Konings 2009) resulted in the recurrence of Ponzi schemes. This banking ‘deregulation’ law 
changed the historical role of banks of being responsible for assessing creditworthiness and 
including risks in their balance sheets. Credit rating agencies have replaced their traditional 
role. It has been revealed during the subprime crisis that banks have been selling ‘junk 
packages’ of subprime loans that were not on their balance sheets (see Kregel 2007, 2008). 
 
In his statement at the hearing of the US House Financial Services Committee on ‘The 
State of the Bond Insurance Industry’, William Ackman (2008: 2), managing member of the 
investment adviser Pershing Square Capital Management, has pinpointed the problem in the 
US bond insurance industry: 
 
The poor decisions of holding company executives are the primary cause for the bond 
insurers’ problems, but the rating agencies also share responsibility.  
 
The rating agencies encouraged the bond insurers to diversify into structured finance 
risks and gave them additional rating credit for doing so. The rating agencies understated 
the risks of the new strategy while earning much higher fees for rating these structures.  
 
The rating agencies’ profits soared along with the growth in structured finance issuance. 
Insurance regulators relied on the rating agencies and management teams to assess the 
risk of these new structures. 
 
The rating agencies were paid by the issuers of these securities and helped in structuring 
these exotic instruments to meet the ratings agencies’ insufficient standards for Triple A 
ratings. The rating agencies only received their full fees if they approved the Triple A 
ratings for these transactions. 
 
The combination of aggressive risk taking by management, poor judgment by conflicted 
rating agencies, and over-reliance by regulatory authorities on rating agency judgment led 
to the current situation. 
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This revelation from an insider manifests again the ineptitude, corruption, and unrestrained 
greed of the economic elites, exacerbating as well as accelerating the structural imperatives 
of the endogenous instability and inherent fragility of the financial markets. 
 
 
Fundamentally the Same Responses to the Global Crisis 
 
There have been varying responses from individuals, states, and global institutions to the 
current crisis which could nevertheless be divided into, broadly speaking, three general 
schools of thought: Schumpeterian, Keynesian, and Marxist. The Schumpeterian responses 
are proposals coming from evolutionary economists who together with market 
fundamentalists basically argue to ‘let the system burn out alone’. The Keynesian 
responses—which have in a paradox received support even among ‘free market’ 
ideologues—come from international organisations and individual governments trying to 
‘repair the system’. And the Marxist responses are from organic, critical intellectuals, civil 
society, and global justice movements—who have long been criticising the current mode of 
production linked with the destruction of the environment—pushing to ‘replace the system’. 
 
The Schumpeterians are perhaps the most complacent and even welcoming of the crisis 
for two reasons. First is that the history of booms and crises is in the logic of business cycles. 
And second is that, as Joseph Schumpeter (1939) observes in his study of business cycles: 
‘Times of innovation ... are times of effort and sacrifice, of work for the future, while the 
harvest comes after.... The harvest is gathered under recessive symptoms and with more 
anxiety than rejoicing.... [During] recession ... much dead wood disappears’. 
 
The Great Recession of 2008 is said to have ushered in a Keynesian redux especially in 
economic policy-making. Keynesians, together with their post-Keynesian colleagues, call for 
the repair of the system but without encouraging the irrationally exuberant behaviour that 
caused the crisis. They have various proposals ranging from the use of monetary policy to 
countercyclical fiscal policy, to the enforcement of policy coordination at national and global 
levels, to the establishment of the New Bretton Woods, and to the creation of a world 
currency unit. But what is striking among the Keynesian proposals was John Maynard 
Keynes’ (1933 [1972]) idea of national self-sufficiency with a call for the nationalisation of 
finance: ‘Ideas, knowledge, science, hospitality, travel—these are the things which should of 
their nature be international. But let goods be homespun whenever it is reasonably and 
conveniently possible, and, above all, let finance be primarily national’. 
 
The Marxists have been the most vocal about the inherent crisis and contradictions of 
capitalism. They see that capitalism lives by crises and will be accompanied by crises to its 
grave. Basically, Marx’s theory of crisis has two interrelated components: crisis of 
overproduction and the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. First, since capitalism is a system 
of production for profits and not for needs, there’s a structural tendency for overcapacity 
which, in turn, leads to a crisis of realising surplus value. In other words, too much is 
produced for the capitalists to sell at a profit. And second, there is a crisis in extracting 
surplus value, where there is a mismatch between the increasing amount of total capital 
invested and the unchanging amount of surplus value generated. The disembedding of 
finance capital from the real economy of production is a wily attempt at overcoming this 
crisis through ‘innovative’ and speculative financial instruments extracting value out of 
already exhausted value. As Marx (1858) puts it: ‘The real barrier of capitalist production is 
capital itself’. Marxists argue that no amount of Schumpeterian and Keynesian tinkering with 
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the capitalist system can resolve the fundamental contradictions inherent in capitalism. As 
Marx and Engels (1848) asserted: Capitalism is ‘like a sorcerer who is no longer able to 
control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells’. The fundamental 
contradiction of capitalist reproduction therefore is the reproduction of ‘social antagonisms 
that spring from the natural laws of capitalist production’. In this moment of capitalist crisis 
again, Marxists thus call for the overthrow of the system to be replaced by a democratic 
socialist alternative. 
 
Leaving the theoretically-informed responses to the global crisis the question is whether 
there are any significant changes at all to the visions and strategies of global governance 
institutions (specifically the World Bank, the IMF, and their G-20 allies), regional 
organisations (like the Asian Development Bank [ADB] and the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations [ASEAN]), the states (in East and Southeast Asia), and the social movements 
(civil society and global justice movements)? One key argument of this paper is that the 
reactions of these actors and institutions are exactly the same or mere reassertions of the same 
strategies, perspectives, ideology, and visions ever since, with or without the crisis.  
 
The World Bank, IMF and their G-20 Allies: Using the global crisis to their 
advantage 
 
Over the last decade, the neo-liberal global governance institutions—the World Bank, the 
IMF, and the WTO—have been facing severe crisis of legitimacy and credibility. The 
disillusionment with these institutions come from the series of political-economic crises they 
themselves have inflicted on countries that they were supposed to manage, restructure, and 
develop. In addition to the not so well-publicised budgetary crisis, failed projects and 
prescriptions of the World Bank (see Woods 2006; Bello 2006), the dramas and revelations 
during the successive resignations of Joseph Stiglitz and Ravi Kanbur in the early 2000s 
demonstrated the Bank’s strong neo-classical and neo-liberal stance. The IMF received 
crushing blows from heavily indebted countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia promising 
to never again be subjected to neo-liberal hardship. The WTO has been struggling for 
survival as the almost five-year long Doha Development Trade Round collapsed in mid-2006. 
But with the current global crisis, predictions about the imminent demise of these neo-liberal 
multilateral institutions appear premature, if not unfounded. In a concerted effort, they have 
risen up to the challenge of the crisis, not to admit and rectify errors in the past, but to 
reassert their presumed legitimacy and raison d'être. 
 
Writing in July 2007—barely a month before the US subprime mortgage crisis became 
apparent—in commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the 1997 Asia crisis, the scholar-
activist Walden Bello (2007), remarked about the ‘demise of the IMF’: 
 
“Never again” became the slogan of a number of the affected governments. The Thaksin 
government in Thailand declared its “financial independence” from the IMF after paying 
off its debts in 2003, vowing never to return to the Fund. Indonesia has said it will pay off 
all its debts to the IMF by 2008. The Philippines has refrained from contracting new 
loans from the Fund, while Malaysia defied it by imposing capital controls at the height 
of the crisis. 
 
Ironically, then, the IMF has become one of the key victims of the 1997 debacle. This 
arrogant institution of some 1,000 elite economists never recovered from the severe crisis 
of legitimacy and credibility that overtook it—a crisis that was deepened by the 
bankruptcy of its star pupil Argentina in 2002. In 2006, Brazil and Argentina, following 
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Thailand’s example, paid off all their debts to the Fund in order to achieve financial 
independence. Then Hugo Chavez let the other shoe drop by announcing that Venezuela 
would leave the IMF and the World Bank. This boycott by its biggest borrowers has 
translated into a budget crisis for the IMF. 
 
But in less than two years, the global crisis has turned the tide, and it has also resulted in a 
revival of the IMF. Perhaps the happiest person in the world at this time of crisis is none 
other than Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director of the IMF, who triumphantly 
expressed during the G-20 Press Conference on 2 April 2009 that the: ‘IMF is back. Today 
you get the proof when you read the communiqué, each paragraph, or almost each 
paragraph—let’s say the important ones—are in one way or another related to IMF work’ 
(IMF 2009b).  
 
Ironically, the very same countries that suffered from decades of IMF conditionalities 
identified by Bello—specifically, Argentina, Brasil, and Indonesia which are now part of the 
G-20 following the G-7’s expansion in 1999 to include emerging economies—were the ones 
who breathed new life to the Fund and thereby affirmed its legitimacy and relevance. The G-
20 Summits in London (April 2009) and Pittsburgh (September 2009) have affirmed the 
International Financial Institutions’ (IFIs) ‘important role in supporting (G-20’s) work to 
secure sustainable growth, stability, job creation, development and poverty reduction. It is 
therefore critical that (they) continue to increase their relevance, responsiveness, 
effectiveness and legitimacy’ (G-20 2009d: para 5). In addition, the new project for economic 
cooperation enshrined in the G20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth 
will be assisted and ‘supported by IMF and World Bank analyses’ (G-20 2009d: para 3; see 
also G-20 2009a, 2009b, 2009c.). This in effect makes the G20 another strategic institution, 
notwithstanding what they proclaim as an ‘informal forum’, through which the World Bank 
and IMF agenda are expressed and, more importantly, legitimised. However, despite the 
G20’s claim that they enjoy legitimacy, credibility, and economic weight, the hundreds of 
vulnerable and marginalised poor countries outside the Group are not represented and hence 
neglected. The crisis that could have killed the IMF and World Bank is also the one that has 
resurrected it. And the countries that were supposed to disdain them were also the ones who 
retain them. 
 
While the world awaited the G20 Summit in London in April 2009 and some hoped for a 
possibility of change in the global economic architecture, one could easily predict the crisis 
responses of the G20 member countries, especially those of the World Bank and the IMF. A 
close reading of the policy prescriptions of the World Bank and IMF re the global crisis 
documented prior to the G20 London Summit could already give the idea of their agenda for 
the Summit: that is, the crisis offers an opportunity not to retreat from the global neo-liberal 
project but to further advance a truly open international financial architecture and competitive 
markets that are coordinated, regulated, and enforced by them at the global scale. 
 
The World Bank’s, Global Monitoring Report 2009: A Development Emergency echoes 
exactly the same neo-liberal programme and project that it has been pursuing from the early 
1990s to present (see Cammack 2003, 2009a, 2009b). In particular, the Bank’s six priority 
areas are: [1] fiscal response to ensure macroeconomic stability; [2] prominent role of the 
private sector in investment, business, enterprises, finance, trade, and business to improve 
stability of the financial system; [3] ‘leveraging the private sector’s role in the financing and 
delivery of services’; [4] prescribing national governments to ‘hold firm against rising 
protectionist pressures and maintain an open international trade and finance system’; [5] 
expediting the completion of the Doha negotiations; and [6] assertion of the ‘key role’ of the 
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World Bank and the IMF ‘in bridging the large financing gap for developing countries 
resulting from the slump in private capital flows, including using their leverage ability to help 
revive private flows’ and thereby calling for the necessity for them to ‘have the mandate, 
resources, and instruments to support an effective global response to the global crisis’ (World 
Bank 2009: xii). A couple of days before the London Summit, World Bank President Robert 
Zoellick (31 March 2009, prior to the G-20 Meeting) repeated the same script pushing for an 
agenda to revitalise the multilaterals, namely: ‘a WTO monitoring system’ to complete the 
Doha negotiations; a monitoring role for the IMF to assess stimulus packages; and ‘an 
overhaul of the financial regulatory and supervisory system’ in which authority over 
regulation rests on national governments under an expanded Financial Stability Forum, which 
works ‘with the IMF and the World Bank group on implementation’ (Cammack 2009b). 
 
IMF’s Initial Lessons of the Crisis for the Global Architecture and the IMF released in 
February 2009 sees the crisis as ‘a unique opportunity … to make progress on seemingly 
intractable issues’. Here the IMF has resolved not to miss the moment. While the IMF 
acknowledges that ‘(t)he crisis has revealed flaws in key dimensions of the current global 
architecture’, the bottom line is that they uphold long held principles and propose to impose 
same policies again and again such as: [1] surveillance mechanisms that were first articulated 
after the 1997 Asia crisis and the dot-com bust in 2001 to allow them to detect vulnerabilities 
and risks at an early stage for their timely intervention; [2] that they be strengthened and 
mandated ‘to take leadership in responding to systemic concerns about the international 
economy’; [3] rules governing cross-border finance;  [4] that they be given ‘readily available 
resources’ ‘for liquidity support and easing external adjustment’ (IMF 2009a: 13). 
 
The Asian Development Bank and the ASEAN: Banking-as-usual for the private 
sector and for free flow of capital, goods, services and investment 
 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) proactively responded to the fiscal needs of its 
developing member countries affected by the global crisis through ‘lending assistance’ 
amounting to USD 32 billion for the period 2009-2010 (ADB 2009). As expected, it is 
banking-as-usual for the ADB—these are ‘loans’ extended to needy Asian countries to be 
paid from five to 15 years whose interest rates are determined by the London Interbank 
Offered Rate (LIBOR) either on a floating-rate or fixed-rate basis (see ADB 2008). Typical 
of ADB’s agenda and priorities for the private sector since time immemorial, 44% of the loan 
are for programmes to stimulate growth and restore private sector confidence; 35% for 
countercyclical support facility (a new short-term loan extended to middle-income member 
countries) for structural reforms toward an attractive investment climate; 12% for trade 
facilitation to support private sector development; but only 6% for infrastructure and a 
measly 3% for social protection (see ADB 2009). Of course, the debtor governments (read: 
the people and the tax payers) guarantee these loans, absorb all the risks, and are accountable 
even when the private sector fails and is responsible for the crisis. 
 
A month prior to the G20 London Summit, the ASEAN Heads of States/Governments 
had its 14th Summit in Cha-am Hua Hin, Thailand and had a caucus on 1 March 2009 to 
discuss the global economic and financial crisis and come up with their agenda which 
Indonesia, the only ASEAN member country of the G20, is ought to convey to the G20 
leaders. What the caucus’ final statement declares are exactly of the same theme, and even 
using the same words, that the World Bank, IMF, and ADB spelled out in their respective 
responses to the global crisis. The ASEAN leaders: concurred [a] ‘to restore market 
confidence and ensure continued financial stability’; [b] ‘welcomed expansionary 
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macroeconomic policies, including fiscal stimulus’ and ‘measures to support private sector, 
particularly SMEs’; [c] ‘stressed the importance of coordinating policies’; [d] ‘reaffirmed 
their determination to ensure the free flow of goods, services and investment, and facilitate 
movement of business persons, professionals, talents and labour, and freer flow of capital’; 
[d] ‘agreed to stand firm against protectionism and to refrain from introducing and raising 
new barriers’; [e] ‘agreed to intensify efforts to ensure a strong Doha Development Agenda 
outcome’; [f] ‘develop a more robust and effective surveillance mechanism’; [g] ‘welcomed 
the new Asian Bond Markets Initiative Roadmap’; [h] called for ‘more coordinated action by 
both developed and developing countries … to restore financial stability and ensure the 
continued functioning of financial markets to provide support to growth’; and [i] ‘called for a 
bold and urgent reform of the international financial system’ (ASEAN 2009c). This 
declaration is simply coherent with ASEAN’s commitment towards the neo-liberal ideals of 
free trade, competitiveness, and an open market economy being institutionalised over the last 
decade and will be pursued in the years to come. With the adoption of the ASEAN Charter at 
the end of 2008, ASEAN member countries have expressed their commitment to deepen 
Asian integration, patterned after the EU, towards the creation of a single market and 
productive space by 2015 (see ASEAN 2009a, ASEAN 2009b). Rather than being cautious of 
the promises of free trade under conditions of the current crisis, ASEAN has had sealed 
investment and free trade agreements with countries in the Asia Pacific (Australia and New 
Zealand), East Asia (South Korea and China), and South Asia (India) almost every month 
from February to August 2009.  
 
UN Commission of Experts on Reforms of the International Monetary and 
Financial Systems: Heterodoxy Rearticulated 
 
On November 2008, the President of the UN General Assembly convened a Commission 
of Experts to study the global crisis and propose reforms on the international monetary and 
financial systems. The experts include a school of heterodox economists and activists, 
namely: the Keynesian Joseph Stiglitz as chair, the critical political economist Jomo KS and 
the Hirschmanesque José Antonio Ocampo as members, the post-Keynesian/Minskyian Jan 
Kregel as rapporteur, and the World Social Forum activist François Houtart as special 
representative. To those familiar with the works and advocacies of these experts, the 139-
page final report can be read as a summary of the essentials of the Commission members’ 
lifelong experiences and writings as policy-makers, scholars, and activists. They articulated 
in the deliberations and put in the final report their long held heterodox economic ideas and 
critic against neo-liberal globalisation formulated in words that meet the exigencies of the 
current global crisis. 
 
As longtime critics of market fundamentalism that has shaped mainstream development 
policy and discourse for the last 35 years or so, the Commission of Experts started their 
conclusion with a remark that ‘the crisis is man-made’ (UN 2009: 132): 
 
The crisis is not just a once in a century accident, something that just happened to the 
economy, something that could not be anticipated, less alone avoided. We believe that, to the 
contrary, the crisis is man-made: it was the result of mistakes by the private sector and 
misguided and failed policies of the public.  
 
Eight common themes have been laid out in the analysis: [1] growing inequalities in most 
countries in the world; [2] the global scope of the crisis that requires responses from a global 
perspective; [3] existence of large global asymmetries, specifically asymmetric responses 
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between the developed and developing countries that perpetuates the unjust transfer of funds 
from the poor to the rich countries that have caused the conflagration in the first place; [4] 
inadequate financial regulation; [5] the mismatch between the pace of economic globalisation 
and the development of political institutions both at the national and international levels; [6] 
the pervasiveness of externalities, an instance of market failure that renders the ‘efficient 
market hypothesis’ meaningless—this in turn calls for coordination of global financial 
regulation and the availability of resources especially for the developing economies to 
conduct countercyclical fiscal policies; [7] financial ‘innovations’ that failed to manage risks 
and enhanced problems of information asymmetries, and the problems of too-big-to-fail, too-
big-to-be-resolved banks as results of inadequate competition laws and enforcement 
deficiency; and [8] crisis as both opportunity (to engage in reforms) and danger (power 
structures reinforcing inequalities and inequities). 
 
The Commission then went on to propose a large number of recommendations taking 
their heterodox economics perspective as point of departure including: [a] creation of 
institutions to coordinate global economic policy such as Global Economic Coordination 
Council and International Panel of Experts; [b] the need for a New Credit Facility with 
governance structure responsive to the needs of both lenders and borrowers; [c] reform in the 
systems of risk management, including the sharing and transferring of risks from those less 
able to bear them to those more able to do; and [d] addressing the problem of insufficient 
aggregate demand even after the crisis which makes it imperative for fundamental reforms 
such as a new global reserve system and for a careful ‘exit strategy’ from existing stimulus 
policies. 
 
Global Civil Society: ‘We told you so!’ 
 
‘We told you so’ has become a prominent slogan of the critics of neo-liberal globalisation 
as the cacophony of crises exploded and shook the world. The analysis of the global civil 
society expressed in various people’s forums and channels since the 1990s have been 
vindicated by the global crisis. They are therefore proposing alternative futures that they have 
long been articulating, hoping that the global crisis would usher in a much more caring and 
just world. For instance, the World Social Forum (WSF) and the Asia-Europe People’s 
Forum (AEPF), which are broad networks of civil society and social movements across the 
globe, have looked at the global crisis as ‘an opportunity for another world’ and ‘an historic 
opportunity for transformation’, respectively. The WSF is said to have been ‘revitalized by 
the global crisis’ as renewed interests in their call for ‘Another World Is Possible’ arise 
(Osava 2008). The AEPF likewise continues to critic neo-liberal globalisation and reiterates 
the policy reforms and programmes in the areas of politics, economics, and culture constantly 
formulated in their biennial Forums since 1998 in accordance with their founding principles 
for a people-centered peaceful, developed, and democratic world (see AEPF 2009). 
 
Yet, the global civil society is confronted with a paradox at this moment of the global 
crisis: the crisis simultaneously weakens and activates the social forces of change and 
alternatives. While the global civil society has been vindicated, at least in their analysis and 
call for change, the pro-neo-liberal forces have been in concert in recovering the system and 
the maintenance of the status quo (see Bienefeld 2007; Schmidt 2009). If there is an 
increasing need for change to the crisis-prone global capitalist system, the forces of 
alternative futures are faced with a Gramscian and a Marxist realpolitik which render them 
incapable to eliminate the recurrent social and economic disasters endemic to the capitalist 
system. 
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This is the great Gramscian realpolitik challenge to the alternative forces: ‘The crisis 
consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this 
interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear’ (Gramsci 1971). And once again, it 
is as if Marx (1852) is speaking to the alternative forces of today about the great, all-time 
contradiction in struggle for social change:  
 
(People) make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make 
it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and 
transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare 
on the brains of the living. And just as they seem to be occupied with revolutionizing 
themselves and things, creating something that did not exist before, precisely in such 
epochs of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their 
service, borrowing from them names, battle slogans, and costumes in order to present this 
new scene in world history in time-honored disguise and borrowed language. 
 
 
Lessons from Authoritarian Liberalism in Asia 
 
An emerging political-economic regime is being institutionalised in East and Southeast Asia. 
It is called ‘authoritarian liberalism’, where authoritarian polities are embedded in a market 
economy. It is also within this framework that these parts of Asia are responding and 
progressing during the global crisis and this region provides important lessons in order to 
understand the eventual and most probable outcome of the present global recession (Schmidt 
2008a, 2008b). 
 
Asian Political Economy: Neoliberal Economies Embedded in Authoritarian 
Polities 
 
There are two mainstream theses that cannot explain contemporary political economy of 
East and Southeast Asia under conditions of global capitalism: first is the ‘democratic peace’ 
that claims that democracies do not go to wars against each other; and second is 
‘modernisation theory’ of the hyperglobalist that says that globalisation necessarily creates a 
world of liberal democracies. 
 
The US-led war on terror, launched in Asia in early 2000s as a response to the 9/11 terror 
attacks, seems to have provided ‘exceptional’ powers to Asian governments, expanding their 
discretionary powers of detention and surveillance. Asian (semi-)authoritarian regimes have 
become strategic sites of opposing terrorism. The human rights situation in Asia after the 
events of 9/11 is alarming. In recent years, Asia has hit the headlines with the numerous cases 
of outright killing of human rights defenders and journalists in the Philippines and the 
heartless killing and harassment of monks and their sympathisers in Burma. These killings 
pose serious threats to freedom of expression and constitute a violation of the right to life. 
 
Post-9/11 Asia is by far a region of authoritarianisms—a security complex of 
authoritarianisms. Regional stability seems to come from a ‘peaceful coexistence among 
authoritarianisms’, rather than among democracies, following the policy of non-interference 
which every government in the region normatively proclaims. The region is progressing 
towards the resurgence, or deepening of, a variation of authoritarianisms: (semi-)authoritarian 
regimes in China, Malaysia and Singapore; the military government in Myanmar; the 
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influence and prominent role of the military and monarchy in Thailand; the monarchy in 
Brunei; one-party rule in China, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam; a military general leadership, 
culture of impunity, and continued militarisation in Aceh and Papua in Indonesia; and an 
administration predisposed to authoritarianism and the militarisation of the cities and 
countryside in the Philippines (see Juego 2008a). Time and again, numerous researches 
conducted to guide policies for protecting human rights have identified the conditions under 
which governments and people are most likely to commit large scale murder, torture, and 
arbitrary imprisonment. They conclude that authoritarianism, alongside war and poverty, can 
lead to large scale human rights violations. 
 
The toppling of two military regimes—Ferdinand Marcos’ in the Philippines in 1986 and 
Suharto’s in Indonesia in 1998—were regarded as ‘democratic moments’, signalling the 
process of democratisation in the broader region. This comes at a time when the dominant 
discourse from mainstream scholars and policy-makers prophesies that economic 
liberalisation encourages the development of liberal and democratic modes of governance. 
The mainstream assumes that the liberation of a self-reliant and progressive middle class 
from authoritarian rule was a functional requirement of well-managed markets. Today, such a 
claim appears hollow. Theoretically, the model of liberal democracy generally proposed in 
the transitions literature was always thin. It alienated the idea of democracy from its social 
connotation as popular power in favor of ‘formal’ and procedural criteria, symbolised above 
all by the holding of regular multi-party elections and the ‘effectiveness’ of political 
institutions. The principles and associated practices of people’s sovereignty, including the 
accountability and responsiveness of governments, and political expression and participation 
by voters and citizens, hardly featured at all in this research programme. Empirically, Asia 
appears to demonstrate a quite different prospectus from this dominant discourse—
characterised by limited accountable government, relatively unfree and unfair competitive 
elections, partially curtailed substantial civil and political rights, and compromised 
associational autonomy. In fact, neo-liberal globalisation and its crisis prone economics may 
mean the end of liberal democracy rather than its triumphant ascendancy. Historically, if 
there is any cogent lesson that the past two decades have shown about the relationship 
between democracy and political-economic regime, it is that a market economy can thrive 
and survive even without democracy (Juego 2008a). Asian elites do not necessarily become 
forces for political liberalism and democracy; they can be downright illiberal and anti-
democratic so long as it serves their interests (Rodan et al. 2006). 
 
The 1997 Asia crisis accelerated the reorganisation of state authority and regulatory 
frameworks that were already in train long before the crisis in East and Southeast Asia. 
Central to these political-economic forms is ‘the emergence of the new regulatory state, 
which is directed towards the production of economic and social order within a globalised 
economy’ (Jayasuriya 2005; see also Jayasuriya 2000 and 2001). The rationale behind this 
attempted transformation of political authority is clear. Through the provision of new 
regulatory frameworks, the state seeks to insulate a range of key economic institutions from 
the influence of democratic politics and thereby safeguard the market order. The outcome is 
an explicit linkage between authoritarian politics and a rules-based mode of governance in a 
range of economic policy areas. It is, in Jayasuriya’s (2001: 8) memorable phrase, ‘a politics 
of anti politics’. 
 
Page 19 of 25 
1997 Asia Financial Crisis 
 
Looking back on the 1997 Asia financial crisis experience, the political strategies and 
social policies carried out in response to it had been detrimental to democratisation, human 
rights, and the poor. 
 
First, the crisis provided the political, economic, and intellectual justification for 
authoritarian rule—couched in the language of ‘Asian values’—especially among Asian 
elites (notably in Malaysia, Singapore, China, and Thailand). These elites also came out to 
explicitly repeat the inappropriateness of Western European welfare state system. 
 
Second, the crisis had sidelined human rights obligations on civil and political rights in 
the name of surveillance and internal security (such as in Malaysia and Singapore) and on 
social and economic rights in the name of belt-tightening measures (resulting in the reduction 
of social spending in many countries like Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand). 
 
And third, the policy responses to the crisis coming from governments and international 
institutions were designed to save and protect the market, businesses, and corporations. For 
instance, the Second Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM-2) held in London in 1998 created the 
‘ASEM Trust Fund’ which eventually proved to be lacking in political will and institutional 
mechanisms to ensure that the fund targets the poor and the workers who were the most 
vulnerable and adversely affected groups during the crisis. 
 
In short, in times of crisis democratisation may be stalled, human rights compromised, 
and the poor severely neglected.  
 
The ASEAN 2015 Project Towards a Single Market 
 
The crisis responses of East and Southeast Asian states are bold and explicit that there is 
no backtracking on authoritarian liberalism. The multi-billion dollar economic stimulus 
packages carried out by these countries as well as the multi-million loans they have received 
from the ADB are all directed and oriented towards economic growth recovery, private sector 
assistance, and an open market economy, and less on social protection for the poor (see 
ASEAN Affairs 2008; ADB 2009). Still, in a highly volatile political-economic situation 
there are risks that these billions of dollars can generate sharper budget deficits and even lead 
to another debt crisis. In fact, it is in the context of the three successive major economic 
crises in the last decade—the 1997 Asia crisis, the 2001 dot-com bubble collapse, and the 
2008 Great Recession—that a daring project for an ASEAN single market by 2015 has been 
launched following the ratification of the ASEAN Charter on December 2008. Add to this, as 
already mentioned above, is a series of trade and investment agreements in the region have 
been signed and adopted in the first half of 2009, namely: ASEAN free trade agreements with 
Australia and New Zealand, investment and trade in goods and services within ASEAN itself; 
ASEAN investment agreements with South Korea and China, and ASEAN trade in goods 
agreement with India. 
 
All these commitment to an open, competitive market economy are expressed only on 
paper. But the realpolitik is at the national level of individual member countries. Asian elites 
are much more responsive to their personal interests than to their ideological commitment. 
They can be profoundly anti-market and counter-competitive so long as it serves their 
interests.  
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Concluding Remarks 
 
We have addressed four inter-related themes in this paper with the hope of contributing to a 
critical understanding of the dynamics in contemporary political economy in the context of 
the cacophony of crises in today’s global capitalism: [a] the constitutive role of crises in the 
evolution of neo-liberalism; [b] the mechanisms of the recurrence of financial crises with 
emphasis on the structural instability of financial markets to disintegrate that has been 
exacerbated by the greedy, corrupt, and inept economic agents especially the economic elites 
but carried out by political elites; [c] the fundamentally similar responses of both pro- and 
anti-neoliberal forces articulated long before the global crisis; and [d] the probable 
strengthening and even acceleration of emergent authoritarian liberalism in East and 
Southeast Asia in the context of the global crisis. The discussion in this paper also points to 
four conclusions. 
 
 First, crises play a constitutive role in the evolution of neo-liberalism. That is to say, 
neo-liberalism was born out of the crises of the mid-1970s, has evolved through a series of 
crises over the last 35 years, and died of the cacophony of crises culminating in the current 
global crisis. (Neo-liberalism has died only in form of market fundamentalism, but not in the 
substance of capitalism as a specific capital-labour relation and a process of capital 
accumulation). As it shows, crises have so far been functional, rather than dysfunctional, to 
neo-liberalism in the following sense: 
 
1. Crises reshape class and social relations but in ways that perpetuate the 
hegemony of capital over labour and the preservation of elite rule. 
2. Crises restrategize development plans of institutions from international 
organisations to states to further advance, not retreat from, market-led 
development. 
3. Crises restructure states and societies in which social institutions are 
oriented towards the logic, requirements, and imperatives of neo-
liberalism. 
 
Second, the structure of financial markets is endogenously fragile—that is, long periods 
of stability in the market lead to instability. This inherently unstable structure of financial 
markets is reinforced by the greed, corruption, irresponsibility, and ineptitude of economic 
elites that in turn accelerates and aggravates the crisis. It is this vicious structure-agency 
interaction that keeps financial crises recurring. The limitlessness of money, in contrast with 
the limited nature of other forms capital, in the epoch of global capitalism essentially 
reinforces the domination of finance and the stagnation of the real economy. But then again, 
as the global crisis pushes up the limits of the finite planet, the wisdom coming from a 
prophecy of the Cree American Indian tribe is worth a serious reflection: 
 
Only after the last tree has been cut down.  
Only after the last river has been poisoned.  
Only after the last fish has been caught. 
Only then will you find that money cannot be eaten. 
 
It would thus be of crucial importance not to miss this moment of crisis to question the 
limitlessness of money and to rethink invaluable economic activity that is not merely reduced 
to what is valuable. GDP, for instance, is nothing but an aggregate of value created in the 
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economy writ large. But treating it as the paramount measure of productive economic activity 
contributes essentially to securing the hegemony of the commodification of human life. 
 
Third, people and groups from all ideological positions look at the global crisis as both 
danger and opportunity. They particularly look at the crisis as an opportunity to advance their 
respective causes and interests. The UN Commission of Experts (2009) perfectly captures the 
dynamics of the struggle at hand: 
 
This crisis should be seen as an opportunity to engage in necessary reforms. Historically, 
moments of crises often provide a rare chance for fundamental reforms that would 
otherwise be impossible. But there is also a danger: existing power structures can seize 
hold of these moments of crisis and use them for their own benefit, reinforcing 
inequalities and inequities. There may be a greater concentration of economic and 
political power after the crisis than before. This has happened in the past and seems to be 
happening in this crisis in certain countries, as the share of the too-big-to-fail banks has 
increased even further (UN 2009: 36). 
 
Indeed, to explore opportunities is sensible, but the danger posed by the existing power 
structure that has been deeply entrenched in history is a cause for vigilance. 
  
The responses to the global crisis from the multilaterals, to regional organisations, to 
states, and to civil society, coming from either proponents or critics of neo-liberal 
globalisation, are fundamentally the same through the years, with or without crisis. The pro-
neoliberal forces are not retreating from unfettered market-led development, but rather 
further advance their longtime pro-market projects and programmes with stronger and better 
institutions. And the anti-neoliberal forces continue to critic attempts to recover neo-
liberalism and reassert their call for alternative futures. As the song goes, ‘The fundamental 
things apply as time goes by’. There is however differential catastrophic impacts across 
social classes, especially among the poor, marginalised, and vulnerable sectors. As always, 
crises all the more inflict insecurity, instability, and ruin on the lives of workers, the masses, 
and the poor.  
 
And finally, there is a movement towards the institutionalisation of authoritarian 
liberalism in East and Southeast Asia. It is within this emergent political-economic regime 
(market economies in a framework of authoritarian polities) that countries in the region are 
responding to the crisis.  With the adoption of the ASEAN Charter and thereby the ASEAN 
Economic Community Blueprint, the 10 member countries have categorically committed 
themselves to the furtherance of free trade, competitiveness, and an open market economy; 
thus the perpetuation of a neo-liberal order. However, the feasibility of this vision comes into 
conflict with the realpolitik of the nature of Asian elites—that is, it is their respective 
interests, not ideology that matter at all times. 
 
There are growing clamors for holding the US accountable for unleashing ‘financial 
weapons of mass destruction’ and sparking a global market ‘tsunami’ with the effect of 
disarming and impoverishing the marginalised even more. The financial crisis has further 
stagnated the real economy, created downturns and recessions in both the advanced industrial 
and emerging economies. It appears that 1929 is repeating itself with a world economy 
sliding even towards a new Great Depression. The deep systemic causes of this unfolding 
social and environmental catastrophe under the cacophony of crises are related to the growth 
of endless consumption, increasing levels of inequality, and the unwise institutional 
pathology which, to a very large extent, has been induced by US administrations. The neo-
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liberal imperative has depleted the natural life support system of the planet, disrupted 
hydrology and climate systems, and is indeed threatening human survival. Non-renewable 
natural and human resources are being exhausted. There are also horizontal links and close 
connections between the failures of capitalism and the depletion of oil. Scarcity of water and 
oil is already a security issue that has led to conflicts. Climate change, which was earlier 
interpreted as a transnational ethical problem, has become a major political issue and might 
increasingly be identified as a security concern. This is especially the case when it is linked to 
the systemic failure of the current mode of production—no matter the type of political and 
institutional layer in which the market economy is embedded in. In principle this crisis could 
be resolved by a major systemic shake-up, involving (for example) new economic doctrines 
and new forms of international relations. But this time it is more unlikely for two reasons. 
First, non-renewable natural and human resources are being exhausted and no form of 
capitalism can resolve that (Biel 2000). And second, based on historical experience the 
decline of US hegemony—a declining superpower armed to the teeth—is unlikely to give up 
power voluntarily (Schmidt 2008a, 2008b). 
 
As always, when the capitalist system is in crisis, it is the poor, the workers, and the 
masses who suffer the most. The global crisis is above all a reflection of capitalism’s 
structural contradictions and the moral bankruptcy of political-economic elites. Across the 
world, financial ‘bailouts’, stimulus plans, and other emergency rescue packages have been 
designed as ‘corporate welfarism’ rather than real social welfare programmes. And 
oftentimes, bailouts are peddled as the panacea for this crisis so as to avert the domino effect 
(of crisis spilling over into the entire economic system) and/or the adverse effect (of the crisis 
to innocent people, workers, small depositors and pensioners deeply entrenched in those too-
big-to-fail financial institutions). However, these bailouts and rescue packages entail a huge 
problem and scandal of ‘moral hazard’ in which economic elites maximise their own utility 
without bearing the full consequences of market failure to the detriment of the poor. 
 
Just as the previous capitalist crises gave rise to political pressures to expand social 
commitments so it is also the case in the recent global crisis. However, during crises the very 
functioning of the capitalist system cannot guarantee even the crumbs that are thrown to the 
workers and the poor. Genuine commitment to uplift the living standards of the poor and to 
real social change cannot be expected to come from the greedy elites and the powers-that-be 
who are now in ideological confusion, in interest preservation, and in an all-out fight for 
survival. Indeed, another world is necessary! 
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